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SNAKEHANDLING AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION
State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d. 99 (Tenn. 1975)
Defendants belonged to a religious sect whose members handled
poisonous snakes and drank poison "to confirm the Word of God."'
The Circuit Court of Cocke County, Tennessee, issued a temporary
injunction against handling poisonous snakes or using deadly poisons
in the county.2 After a hearing on stipulated facts,' the court found
1. State ex rel. Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976). Pastor Listor Pack and one of his Elders, Albert Ball, were
charged with drinking a strychnine solution. Both were members of the Holiness
Church of God in Jesus Name located in Newport, Tennessee. Id. This church
is one of a group that originated in Sale Creek at Grasshopper Valley, Tennessee,
near Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1909. W. LA BARnE, THEY SHALL TAKE Up SERPENTS
It (1962) [hereinafter cited as LA BARRE]. Its founder and prophet, George Went
Hensley, was thirty years old when he interpreted as a command the Biblical statement:
They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing it shall not
harm them; they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover.
Mark 16:17-18 (King James ed.) (emphasis added). But see Ecclesiastes 10:11 and 1
Corinthians 10:9 (containing language that argues against snakehandling). Hensley
climbed to White Oak Mountain in Tennessee; found a large rattlesnake; tested this com-
mand; and, began his evangelical work. LA BARRE 11. Hensley developed a cult follow-
ing, left Tennessee, and "kept the religion alive" in Kentucky. Id. at 15. In 1943, the
Dolley Pond Church of God with Signs Following was established in Grasshopper Val-
ley, Tennessee, the religion's place of origin. Id. As the mother church of the move-
ment in the South, it has expanded throughout the South and Southeast. Id.
Members of this church handle snakes and use poison, not as an individual test of
faith or proof of godliness, but solely to "confirm the Word of God" as commanded by
the Bible. State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976). Only those who are "anointed" or "moved" by the "spirit" handle
the snakes or drink the poison. Id. In a description of "anointment," Pastor Pack
stated:
When I become anointed to handle serpents, my hands get real numb. It is
a tremendous feeling. Maybe symbolic to an electric shock, only an electric
shock could hurt you. This'll be pure joy.
It comes from inside ... [sic] If you've got the Holy Ghost in you, it'll
come out and nothing can hurt you. ... You can have faith, but if you never
feel the anointing, you had better leave the serpent alone.
R PELTON & K. GARDEN, SNAKE HANDLERS 32 (1974), quoted in 527 S.W.2d at 106.
Members of the religion abstain from drinking alcohol, carbonated beverages, tea, and
coffee, from smoking, dancing, and the use of cosmetics and medicine. State ex rel.
Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tenn. 1975). Most of the members are rural
inhabitants, and attempts to take the practice to urban centers have failed. LA BARRE
33. See generally N. CALLAHAN, SMOKEY MOUNTAIN COUNTRY 91-95 (1952).
2. State ex rel. Swan v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976). The District Attorney General of the Second Judicial Circuit
filed a petition seeking an injunction against handling snakes and drinking poison.
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a continuing violation of the Tennessee snakehandling statute,4 and
issued a permanent injunction against handling poisonous snakes,5 but
unaccountably failed to enjoin drinking poison by consenting adults.0
The court of appeals found the injunction overbroad and modified it
to prohibit snakehandling dangerous to persons not consenting to the
danger. 7 The Tennessee supreme court reversed and held: Under
the common law of nuisance, the State of Tennessee may enjoin snake-
handling and drinking of deadly poisons as part of a religious ritual with-
out infringing on the free exercise of religion.8
The first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion applies
The trial court found the charges were true and thus that defendants had violated
the Tennessee snakehandling statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2208 (1975), quoted In
note 4 infra.
Although the court had statewide jurisdiction, the temporary injunction was limited
to snakehandling in Cocke County. 527 S.W.2d at 103. Why the court chose to limit
its order geographically to the county is unclear.
3. The court characterized the issues as "not fully developed" and the record as
"meager." 527 S.W.2d at 105. What evidence there was, however, cast serious doubt
on the potential health harms of continued use of snakes in defendants' religious services.
It was stipulated that several witnesses would testify that parishioners were never in im-
mediate danger. An anthropologist was prepared to testify that "she had never seen
anyone endangered by handling snakes" and that "proper precautions were always
taken." Id. at 104 (emphasis added). The church was a half mile from the nearest
paved road at the end of a dead end dirt road. The only evidence of harm was that
an "Indian boy," aged 30, had once been bitten; other than the state's allegation that
"his arm became swollen," id. at 103, there was no evidence of the consequences of this
single bite. Id. at 104.
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2208 (1975):
Handling snakes so as to endanger life-Penalty.--It shall be unlawful for
any person, or persons, to display, exhibit, handle or use any poisonous or dan-
gerous snake or reptile in such a manner as to endanger the life or health of
any person.
5. 527 S.W.2d at 105. The trial court relied on the snakehandling statute to pro-
vide the standard for determining whether defendants' actions could be enjoined. Id.
at 103. Again, unaccountably, the court limited its order to Cocke County. Id. at 105.
6. Id. at 104. This failure was evidently not a mere oversight; the trial court had
explicitly included in its temporary order an exception for drinking strychnine. Id.
7. 527 S.W.2d at 102.
8. Id. at 113.
9. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof . .. .
The Constitution of the State of Tennessee has a comparable provision:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man can of right
be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain
a minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case what-
ever, control or interfere with the righs of conscience; and that no preference
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/6
Vol. 1976:353] COMMENTS 355
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.' 0 The free exercise
clause guarantees absolute protection to religious belief;" the freedom
of speech clause protects public expression of religious beliefs absent
a "clear and present danger" to the public welfare. 12  Other actions
shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of worship.
TENN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3 (1956).
10. The Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), found
that the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from infringing upon the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of religion. Id. at 304. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), the Court held that the first amendment's stricter standards determine
when state action infringes upon a person's rights to free thought and free exercise of
religion rather than the "old" fourteenth amendment equal protection test, which re-
quired only a rational basis between the remedy and the practice to be restricted. Id.
at 639. A first amendment right could be restricted only "to prevent grave and immedi-
ate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." Id. When a court consid-
ers regulation of civil rights, the usual presumption in favor of a statute's constitutional-
ity, .%ee United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), does not apply.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Today, the first and fourteenth amendment
tests for determining the constitutionality of a restriction on religion are similar since
both require a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634 (1969) (one year residency requirement for welfare payments unconstitutional);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (state cannot withhold unemployment
compensation from Seventh Day Adventist for failure to work on Saturdays). See note
22 inIra.
11. The first amendment right of freedom of religious belief absolutely prohibits the
state from requiring or prohibiting any religious belief. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961) (requirement of declaration of belief in God in order to hold state public
office held unconstitutional); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormon
belief in religious polygamy protected by the first amendment although the practice was
not).
A "belief" is a state of mind. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)
("Fieedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society
of free men"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (freedom of belief
considered "freedom of conscience" and freedom to choose any form of religion).
Actions taken to implement religious beliefs, however, receive far less protection. See
notes 13-29 infra and accompanying text.
12, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). Cf. West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943). In discussing the regulation
of speech and press, Mr. Justice Holmes first formulated the clear and present danger
doctrine:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added). Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), applied the clear and present danger test to expression
of religious beliefs by a Jehovah's Witness, whose religion required such proselytizing:
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.
310 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
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implementing religious beliefs, however, receive less protection.'8
In Reynolds v. United States,14 the Supreme Court held that the free
exercise clause does not protect religious action.', Therefore, Con-
Although the Pack court relied on several first amendment cases to extract a "clear
and present danger" test for religious action, 527 S.W.2d at 108-09, these cases rest more
firmly on the first amendment right to free expression than on free exercise of religion.
See, e.g., Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (state statute banning door to door
peddlers held unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, supra (holding unconstitutional state statute requiring children to
salute American flag); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra (state statute prohibiting public
solicitation for religious groups held unconstitutional).
See generally Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applica-
bility, 48 MicH. L. RP v. 811 (1950); Antieau, Clear and Present Danger-Its Meaning
and Significance, 25 NoTm DAME LAW. 603 (1950); Corwin, Freedom of Speech and
Press Under the First Amendment, 30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Religious Freedom-Constitutionality of State Statute Prohibiting Solicitation for
Religious Causes Without Approval of Administrative Official, 26 IoWA L. REV. 126
(1940); Comment, Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion of First Amendment
Freedoms, 13 Omo ST. LJ. 237 (1952).
13. The belief-action dichotomy was articulated even before adoption of the first
amendment. In 1785, Thomas Jefferson defined religious freedom in the preamble of
a bill establishing religious freedom in Virginia. See 12 Hening's Stat. 84, codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (1950):
[MIo suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion,
and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of
their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious
liberty . . . . [It is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil govern-
ment, for its officers to interfere, when principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order . ...
Numerous decisions involving state regulation of religious activity recognize this be.
lief-action dichotomy. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 448 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Cleveland
v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 617, 88 So. 2d
887 (1956); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964);
Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967); State v. Massey,
229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d
409 (1947). See generally Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 327 (1969); Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 So. CAL. L. Rnv.
546 (1963); Lake, Freedom to Worship Curiously, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 203 (1948); Mar-
cus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause,
1973 DuKE L. J. 1217.
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. Id. at 163-64. The Court relied on the Virginia statute establishing religious
freedom, quoted in note 13 supra, and an address by Thomas Jefferson in which he
stated the rule that "the legislative powers of the Government reach actions only, not
opinions." 98 U.S. at 164. Hence the dichotomy: Congress could in no way restrict
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/6
Vol. 1976:3531 COMMENTS
gress could prohibit actions "in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order." 16 Subsequent cases followed this belief-action dichot-
omy and upheld state regulation of conduct threatening "public safety,
peace or order"'17 without seriously considering infringement on religi-
ous freedom of action.'
In Sherbert v. Verner, 9 the Court adopted a balancing test which
weighed the importance of the action to the religious beliefs against
the state's interest in regulating the disputed religious conduct.20
opinion, but retained the power to prohibit all action which the state police power
reached.
16. Id. at 164. Defendant, a member of the Mormon Church, was charged with
the offense of polygamy. Rejecting the argument that his religion required multiple
marriages of members when possible, the Court held that although the defendant had
a right to believe in polygamy, he did not have a right to practice it because polygamy
violated a federal statute. Id. at 167.
The Court found ample grounds for Congress' concern with this social evil:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclu-
sively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law,
the second marriage was always void . . . . Professor Lieber says, polygamy
leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communi-
ties, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long
exist in connection with monogamy. Chancellor Kent observes that this re-
mark is equally striking and profound.
Id. at 164-66. Faced with such consequences, the Court thought the prohibition plainly
within Congressional power: "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices."
Id. at 166.
17. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
18. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding blue laws against
attack by Orthodox Jewish businessmen); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14
(1946) (prohibition of Mormon polygamy); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (prohibition of minors selling literature on city streets valid against Jehovah's
Witnesses' children); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (prohibition of unli-
cened parades by Jehovah's Witnesses); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (prohibi-
tion of Mormon polygamy); McCartney v. Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188
(Sup. Ct. 1968) (compulsory vaccination statute for school children); Kraus v. Cleve-
land, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955) (fluoridation of water).
19. 374U.S. 398 (1963).
20. Id. at 402-09. In Sherbert, complainant, a member of the Seventh Day Adven-
tist Church, was refused state unemployment compensation when she refused employ-
ment which required her to work on Saturdays, claiming that her religion prohibited this.
Id. at 399, 401. The Court held that denying unemployment benefits violated her right
to the free exercise of religion by forcing her to choose between religion and an income.
Id. at 410. Recognizing that both direct and indirect burdens on free exercise of
religion could be unconstitutional, see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
( 1961), the Sherbert Court applied a balancing test involving two determinations: first,
does the regulation impose any burden on the free exercise of religion? second, if so,
Washington University Open Scholarship
358 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:353
Because of the importance of the effective exercise of religious free-
dom,21 the Court permitted only regulation that furthered a compelling
state interest that could not be protected by less restrictive means. 22
The Court reaffirmed and strengthened the balancing test in Wisconsin
v. Yoder-' when it struck down the state's compulsory education law
as applied to the Amish: "only those interests of the highest order and
not otherwise served" justify regulations that stifle religious action.24
may this burden be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate . . ." Id. at 403. See People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 718, 394 P.2d 813, 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1964). Accord,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). In addition, the Court held that the state
must use the least restrictive form of regulation to further its compelling interest. Id.
at 407. See note 22 infra. See generally Clark, supra note 13; Comment, Constitu-
tional Law-Freedom of Religion-Unemployment Law Applied So As to Exclude Sab-
batarians from Benefits Unconstitutional-Sherbert v. Verner, 28 ALBANY L. RaV. 133
(1964); Comment, Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion-Sabbatarian Ex-
emptions, 49 IowA L. REv. 952 (1964); Comment, Religious Accommodation Under
Sherbert v. Verner; The Common Sense of the Matter, 10 VILL. L. REv. 337 (1965).
Although Sherbert v. Verner was the first freedom of religion case in which the Court
explicitly employed a balancing test, the Court earlier appeared to use this approach in
applying the "clear and present danger" standard in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951), a case involving freedom of speech. For a discussion of a pre-Sherbert
balancing test, see Comment, Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion of First
Amendment Freedoms, supra note 12. See also Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present
Danger: Scope of Its Applicability, supra note 12, at 837-40.
21. First amendment rights occupy an elevated position because the basic individual
liberties the amendment grants are necessary to maintain democracy. Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Accord,
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ("[Flreedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 164 (1944) ("All [first amendment freedoms] have preferred positions in our
basic scheme").
The difference between Reynolds and Sherbert is that the latter granted some first
amendment protection to religious action as well as belief. The Sherbert Court recog-
nized that even indirect burdens could impede the "free exercise" of religion: "Here not
only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derived solely from
the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmis-
takable." 374 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). Unless justified by compelling state
interests, this "substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right" was
unconstitutional. Id. at 406.
22. 374 U.S. at 407. The Court has often held that when regulating personal liber-
ties the restriction must be drawn as narrowly as possible. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). See also Richardson, Freedom of Expression and
the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1951); note 20 supra.
23. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. Id. at 215. Amish parents were convicted of violating the state compulsory
school attendance law by refusing to send their children to any high school, Defendants
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The Supreme Court has not applied the balancing test to invalidate
state regulations intended to protect public health, safety, or order. 5
Only the California supreme court in People v. Woody26 has held un-
enforceable a public health measure on the basis of religious freedom.
Since the use of peyote was the "theological heart" of peyotism, the
Woody court concluded that the state's interest in protecting the health
of its citizenry did not justify the effective prohibition of the religion
itself.21 Other courts, however, have uniformly upheld public health,
argued that attendance of public or private high school by their children was detrimental
to the Amish way of life. Id. at 210. They feared that a "worldly" high school educa-
tion would alienate their children from God. Id. at 213. After the children have
learned the "three R's" in the first eight grades, they are withdrawn from school and
taught the skills necessary to be productive members of the agrarian Amish society. Id.
at 212. The Yoder Court reasoned that although the state's interest in compulsory edu-
cation was strong, it was not absolute. Id. at 216. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Rejecting a strict action-
belief dichotomy, see note 13 supra, the Yoder Court stated:
[Olur decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is
always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause ...
ITihere are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the state to control, even
under regulations of general applicability. . . . [Iln this context belief and
action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.
406 U.S. at 219-20. The Court then held the state's interest in compulsory education
insufficient to permit governmental infringement upon the religious rights of the defend-
ants- in the specific context of Amish children, the interests served by compulsory educa-
tion were not overwhelming. 406 U.S. at 225-35. See Note, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-The Balancing Process for Free Exercise Needs a New Scale, 51 N.C. L.
REV. 302 (1972); Comment, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Religion-Amish Parents
Not Required to Enroll Children in Secondary School, 48 Notre Dame Law. 741 (1973).
25. The Court in Yoder took pains to distinguish the Wisconsin compulsory educa-
tion law from a statute regulating public health or safety:
This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been
demonstrated or may be properly inferred. The record is to the contrary
406 U.S. at 230.
26. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
27. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. Defendants, Navajo Indians
and members of the Native American Church of the State of California, were arrested
in an Indian hogan in the desert near Needles, California, while participating in a reli-
gious ceremony involving the use of peyote. Id. at 717, 394 P.2d at 814-15, 40 Cal.
Rptr. at 71. Upon their arrest, defendants handed the police a photostatic copy of the
articles of incorporation of their church which declared "Itihat we further pledge our-
selves to work for unity with the sacramental use of peyote and its religious use." Id.
at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
The California supreme court found that precluding the use of peyote virtually pro-
hibited the practice of the defendants' religion since "[tio forbid the use of peyote is to
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welfare and safety measures which seriously infringed religious beliefs.2 8
In practice, the "compelling state interest" necessary to prohibit religious
action has often been insubstantial.29
remove the theological heart of Peyotism." Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at
74. By contrast, the danger to the state and to the enforcement of its laws was relatively
light. In applying the Sherbert balancing test the court thus found that "[t]he scale
tips in favor of the constitutional protection." Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal.
Rptr. at 77.
The California supreme court distinguished Woody from Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 148 (1878), on two grounds: First, polygamy was a "basic tenet in the theology
of Mormonism," but was not "essential to the practice of the religion," while in Woody
"peyote . . . [was] the sine qua non of defendants' faith." Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820,
40 Cal. Rptr. at 76. Second, "the degree of danger to state interests in Reynolds far
exceeded that in [Woody]." Id. One commentator has argued that polygamy, "a divine
Mormon duty, observable upon pain of damnation," was as essential to Mormonism as
peyote was to peyotism and that Reynolds and Woody can be distinguished only by the
relative importance of the state's interests. Comment, Statute Prohibiting Use of Peyote
Unconstitutional as Applied to Religious Users, 17 STAN. L Rnv. 494, 500 n.42 (1965).
Compare Woody, supra, with State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967). In Bullard, defendant, arrested for possession of
marijuana and peyote, argued that he was a member of the Neo-American Church which
used both substances for religious purposes. Id. Expressing doubt about the defend-
ant's good faith, the court stated that "[e]ven if he were sincere, the first amendment
could not protect him." Id. at 603, 148 S.E.2d at 568. This judicial declaration ap-
pears to be an afterthought. The major distinction between Woody and Bullard may
be the two courts' consideration of the good faith of the defendants' religious beliefs.
Note, Freedom of Religion + LSD = Psychedelic Dilemma, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 52, 56-57
(1967). See generally Marcus, supra note 13, at 1246-51; Comment, Constitutional
Law-Freedom of Religion-Unconstitutionality of State Narcotics Statute as Proscribing
the Sacramental Use of Peyote by Indians-People v. Woody, 6 Aiuz. L. Rav. 305
(1965); Comment, Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion-Illegal Use of Toxic
Drugs-People v. Woody, 14 CAT-. U.L. REy. 120 (1965); Comment, Statute Pro-
hibiting Use of Peyote Unconstitutional as Applied to Religious Uses, supra.
28. See cases cited note 18 supra and notes 30-32 infra.
29. Courts often cite the parade of horribles first set forth in Reynolds:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which
he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously be-
lieved it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pyre of her dead hus-
band, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her car-
rying her belief into practice?
98 U.S. at 166. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 409, 88 So. 2d 880, 884,
cert. denied, 264 Ala. 617, 88 So. 2d 887 (1956); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 603,
148 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967); Harden v. State, 188
Tenn. 17, 23, 216 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1948).
The state interests actually upheld, however, often threaten far less serious social con-
sequences than the Reynolds Court hypothesized. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961), illustrates the essentially trivial state interests that sometimes survive judicial
scrutiny. In Braunfeld, the Supreme Court upheld a state "blue" law against a challenge
by Orthodox Jews who contended that its enforcement would seriously jeopardize their
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In cases preceding Sherbert and its balancing test, state courts
upheld statutes prohibiting snakehandling on the basis of "grave and
immediate danger" to the public or some equivalent standard.30 The
latest Tennessee supreme court decision involving snakehandling,
Harden v. State," applied this standard, held the state snakehandling
statute constitutional and prohibited religious snakehandling.3 2 In addi-
tion to statutory remedies, a state can regulate religious action through
the common law power to abate public nuisances.3"
business operations unless, contrary to their religious tenets, they remained open for
business on Saturday. Although the Court did not apply a balancing test in this pre-
Sherbeit case, it did limit the state's regulatory authority to religious actions which are
"in violation of social duties or subversive of good order .... ." Id. at 603. The
"important" social goal the state sought to protect was "a day of rest, repose, rec-
reation and tranquility" that, in order to minimize the "atmosphere of commercial
noise and activity," must necessarily be the same day for all. Id. at 607-08; see id. at
614-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-
70 (1944) ("sacred" right of parents to direct child's religious training overborne by
public interest in child's welfare, even in "these peripheral instances in which the parents
supervision may reduce but cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the prohibited con-
duct"); Hill v. State, supra (strong hint that legislative declaration that snakehandling is
dangerous is per se ground to prohibit it); State v. Bullard, supra (free exercise clause
does not authorize believer to commit any act that threatens public safety, morals, peace
and order).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which found the state interest in compul-
sory education of children under the age of 16 insufficient to infringe the Amish reli-
gious practices, is the first case to overturn a statute serving more than a minimal state
interest. The Yoder decision was the basis for the Tennessee Court of Appeals decision
in Pack. 527 S.W.2d at 111. Regrettably, the Tennessee Supreme Court completely
misunderstood the case. See notes 51-55 infra and accompanying text.
30. Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 677, 88 So.
2d 887 (1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State
v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216
S.W.2d 708 (1948); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947). See
note 60 infra and accompanying text.
31. 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
32. id. at 25, 216 S.W.2d at 711. The court held that religious snakehandling was
dangerous to the life and health of people "when and whenever the practice was under-
taken." Id. at 24, 216 S.W.2d at 711. See note 60 infra.
33. The State Attorney General has the power to prohibit an action by declaring it
a common law public nuisance. State ex rel. Bd. of Health v. Sommers Rendering Co.,
66 N.J. Super. 334, 169 A.2d 165 (1961). A common law public nuisance is:
[Elverything that endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates
the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable or comportable use of prop-
erty.
Yarbrough v. Louisville & N. Ry., 11 Tenn. App. 456, 458 (1930). A present
or immediate threat of harm is a prerequisite to finding and abating a common law nui-
sance. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d
181 (1976). Even if criminal sanctions apply, a public nuisance can be abated through
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In State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 4 the Tennessee supreme court
balanced the state's interest in the safety of the audience and the snake-
handlers against the defendants' right to the free exercise of their
religion.35  The court agreed that defendants were entitled to first
amendment protection,36 but found their rights subordinate to a "com-
pelling state interest in the face of a clear and present danger so grave
as to endanger paramount public interests. 37  The court distinguished
Yoder on the ground that waiving the compulsory education require-
ment for Amish children would not "impair the health of the children,
nor result in their inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties
and responsibilities of citizenship, nor in any way materially detract
from the welfare of society."3" By contrast, the court considered it self-
evident that snakehandling posed a serious threat to health and safety. 9
Reports of previous death, absence of safeguards, the "entranced" state
of the handlers, and children "roaming about unattended" heavily in-
fluenced the court's decision.40
The Pack court gave only cursory attention to less restrictive alter-
natives such as excluding children or nonmembers from services in
which snakes were handled. Excluding children, the court reasoned,
would conflict with a parent's right to direct the religious education of
his offspring, while excluding nonmembers would interfere with the
"evangelical mission" of the church. 4'
a civil action. Wilson v. Parent, 228 Ore. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961). For a case regu-
lating religious action constituting a public nuisance, see Morrison v. Rawlinson, 193 S.C.
25, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940) ("loud and raucous" church services lasting into early morning
held a public nuisance and prohibited after ten p.m.).
34. 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 924 (1976).
35. Id. But see note 48 infra and accompanying text. The court noted that the
handlers were "so enraptured and entranced that they are in a virtual state of hysteria,"
implying that they were attempting suicide. 527 S.W.2d at 113. But see notes 47 &
48 infra and accompanying text. The court was concerned for the safety of the audience
which was present with "virtually no safeguards." 527 S.W.2d at 113.
36. 527 S.W.2d at 107.
37. Id. at 113.
38. Id. at 111.
39. Id. at 113.
40. Id. The court stated that its research confirmed a general pattern of dangerous
conditions, "human misery and loss of life," so that it would be "derelict" in its duty
if it did not find defendant's guilty of a public nuisance. Id.
41. Id. at 114. The court's reasoning on this point is confusing. See notes 56-59
infra and accompanying text. It is not known whether the defendants would accept reg-
ulation of snakehandling for public safety rather than an outright prohibition since they
were not given the choice.
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Although reaching the trial court's result, the court rested its decision
on the common law of nuisance rather than the Tennessee criminal stat-
ute.42 Since this was a suit to abate a public nuisance rather than a
criminal prosecution, the court determined that the criminal statute was
not controlling but merely expressed in part the Tennessee public
policy on snakehandling.43
Pack is another case sustaining state health and safety regulations
without serious consideration of the public interests or impartial balanc-
ing of those interests against defendants' right to free exercise of their
religion. The court misunderstood Tennessee public policy and mis-
read constitutional requirements. The Tennessee statute only pro-
hibited snakehandling when performed in a dangerous manner.44
Both Harden and Pack assumed, without reliable evidence, that
religious snakehandling was dangerous per se.4  The latter opinion
considered handling a poisonous snake tantamount to a suicide at-
tempt.4" The record contained no evidence supporting such a proposi-
tion: on the record the court could only have concluded that snake-
handling presents no serious health threat.47  A "surprisingly" small
42. 527 S.W.2d at 112. See note 2 supra.
43. 527 S.W.2d at 112. In Home Beneficial Ass'n v. White, 180 Tenn. 585,
177 SW.2d 545 (1944), the Tennessee supreme court stated:
lI]t seems clear that the public policy of the State is to be found in its Consti-
tution, its laws, its judicial decisions and the applicable rules of common law.
'Public policy" is practically synonymous with "public good"....
180 Tenn. at 588, 177 S.W.2d at 546.
The Pack court acknowledged that the Tennessee statute on snakehandling was a
statement of public policy, but dismissed it because
[tihis is not a criminal prosecution. Its consequences are more far-reaching
and it is to be decided on a substantially different basis.
This is a suit to abate a nuisance.
527 S.W.2d at 112.
44. See notes 4 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. The Harden court was explicit:
The language of [the statute] is by necessary implication a legislative declara-
tion that such handling of a poisonous snake is dangerous to life and health.
. . . That statute does by necessary inference declare that such handling of
poisonous snakes is dangerous to the life and health of people. Accordingly,
it forbids that practice.
216 S.W.2d at 709-10.
46. 527 S.W.2d at 113. In discussing the state's right to prevent a person from com-
mitting suicide, the court found that Tennessee "has the right to guard against the un-
necessary creation of widows and orphans," and stated that "most assuredly the handling
of dangerous snakes by untrained persons . . . [i]s not calculated to increase one's life
span." Id.
47. See note 3 supra.
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number of fatalities have resulted from snakehandling in religious
ceremonies, 48 while the audience faces a lesser threat. The court's strict
prohibition was thus contrary to the state policy expressed in the
criminal statute. 49
The court also misunderstood the constitutional requirements im-
posed by Sherbert and Yoder. The former requires a compelling state
48. LA BARE 13-14. One authority on rattlesnakes has stated that only about three
of every one hundred people bitten by rattlesnakes will die. 2 L. KLAUiBER, RATrLE-
SNAKEs 846 (2d ed. 1972). Many snakehandlers have been bitten numerous times and
survived: Tom Harden, leader of the Dolley Pond congregation, has been bitten at least
four times; Paul Lee Dodson has been bitten seventeen times; and, the founder of the
cult, George Went Hensley, claimed to have "been bitten four hundred times 'til I'm
speckled all over like a guinea hen."' LA BARRE 45-46. Dr. Berthold Schwarz, a psy-
chologist, states that some snakehandlers (known as "saints") have claimed to have
been bitten over fifty times. Schwarz, Ordeal by Serpents, Fire and Strychnine, 34 PsY-
cHIATwC Q. 405, 411 (1970). He acknowledged reports of persons in their 70's and
80's who survived snakebites. Id. Four "saints" knew of "only" 18 members of the
Holiness Church who had died from snake bites in 31 years. Id.
Many handlers have never been bitten. Dr. Schwarz says that he has witnessed more
than 200 instances of snakehandling without observing a snakebite. Id. One "saint"
claimed to have handled snakes over 2,000 times without ever having been bitten. Dr.
Schwarz noted that there are no known cases of snakebitten children during these reli-
gious ceremonies. Id. Both La Barre and Schwarz report no cases of snakebites involv-
ing nonhandlers, and no such report appears in any snakehandling case. See note 60
infra.
La Barre proposes the following explanations for the small number of bites and fatali-
ties resulting from snakehandling. First, the handling of the snakes may disrupt their
reflexes since they are accustomed to coiling before striking. Second, the snakes are
"playing possum" as herpetologists maintain some snakes do when approached by hu-
mans. Third, the body heat of the handler has a "drugging effect" on the snakes. Fi-
nally, some snakes, including rattlers, suffer from cataplexy, a sudden loss of muscle
power in animals. No single explanation for the small number of bites has been proven,
and La Barre regards the question of "why more snakehandlers are not bitten as being
unsolved and still open." LA BARRE 20.
Snake experts have offered other explanations for the small number of deaths result-
ing from snakehandling:
The timber rattlesnake, the species usually handled in the services, is one
of the more mild-tempered rattlers; furthermore, when kept in captivity, it is
curiously prone to spells of apathy when almost nothing short of severe injury
will provoke it to strike. The copperhead, the other species commonly han-
dled, has a more uncertain temper but is relatively docile. Its venom is com-
paratively weak, and its bite is probably not able to kill an adult under most
circumstances.
S. MINTON, JR. & M. MINTON, VENOMOUS REPTILEs 186 (1969).
49. Although the criminal statute did not apply in a suit to abate a public nuisance,
it partially evidenced the Tennessee legislature's determination on snakehandling, 527
S.W.2d at 112, and should have been heavily weighed in favor of the defendant when
the restrictions involve his first amendment rights.
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interest to justify prohibition,"0 while the latter rejects the surface
analysis employed in Pack.5 Yoder held that courts "must searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to protect," 2 and followed
that admonition with a rigorous analysis of the state interest in compul-
sory education in the particular context of the Amish children."3 The
Pack court, despite lip service to Yoder, 4 did not attempt a specific
examination. 55
The court's discussion of less restrictive alternatives, required by
Sherbert,5 was equally inadequate. The court ignored the possibility
of safety measures such as snakeproof cages or sealed-off areas.5 7 Its
rejection of a ban on children or nonmembers at snakehandling ser-
vices was completely illogical. Banning a religion's "theological heart"
tends to prohibit the religious belief itself,"" and is obviously more detri-
mental to the religion and its believers than restrictions on the right
50. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
51. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 221-34.
54. 527 S.W.2d at 110-11. The court's lengthy quotation from Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), clearly reveals
the failure to understand Yoder. Both Reynolds and Davis applied the old belief-action
dichotomy, granting no first amendment protection to any action implementing religious
beliefs. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text. In concluding that these cases
always permit health or safety regulations of religious conduct, see 527 S.W.2d at 111,
the court ignored the central rule of Sherbert and Yoder: such health and safety regu-
lations are proper only if they serve compelling state interests that cannot be protected
by less intiusive means.
55. A single conclusory paragraph, 527 S.W.2d at 113, was the sole discussion of
the factual basis underlying the "compelling" state interest in prohibiting religious snake-
handling.
56. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). See note 22 supra and accom-
panying text. In Morrison v. Rawlinson, 193 S.C. 25, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940), a church
was used in a "loud and raucous" manner in a residential area until the early morning
hours. The court issued an injunction prohibiting church services after ten p.m. rather
than closing the church permanently.
57. See 527 S.W.2d at 114. Even when snakehandlers have agreed to comply with
safety regulations, courts have still chosen to prohibit the practice, reasoning that it is
dangerous per se. See State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949), noted in
LA BARRE 42-43. In Massey, the defendants stated that the snakehandlers recognized the
state's right to regulate their practice for safety purposes, but vigorously objected to a
restriction that prohibited the congregation from following its religious practices. The
cout rejected this appeal in upholding the convictions for criminal violation of a city
ordinance prohibiting religious snakehandling. 229 N.C. at 735, 51 S.E.2d at 180. See
notes 41 supra & 60 infra and accompanying text.
58. See note 27 supra.
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to proselytize the public or educate children. 9
State ex rel. Swann v. Pack is another snakehandling decision that
slighted factual considerations and considered snakehandling to be ex-
tremely dangerous based on ill-founded beliefs. 0° The result is a
59. The Pack court recognized that "to forbid snake handling [sic] is to remove the
theological heart of the Holiness Church .... " 527 S.W.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
Although the court realized that the probable result of its decision was the eventual ex-
tinction of the sect, nowhere does it sufficiently weigh this interest against any "compel-
ling" state interest. Clark argues that "[ln cases where [religious snakehandling]
is regarded as an absolute necessity by believers it should be privileged." Clark,
supra note 13, at 364. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. In People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), the California
Supreme Court, using the same balancing test that the Pack court claimed to ap-
ply, weighed this "theological heart" factor heavily and held that the danger to the state
would have to be great to prohibit the practice in question. Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820,
40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
60. Despite the statutory language, religious snakehandling has often been held dan-
gerous per se. See Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734,
51 S.E.2d 179 (1949); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). Al-
though states have adopted two different types of snakehandling statutes, courts' appli-
cation of them has produced identical results. Kentucky has adopted the first and more
restrictive type of statute:
No person shall display, handle, or use any kind of snake or reptile in connec-
tion with any religious service or gathering.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 437.060 (1969). The statute was held constitutional by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 446, 164 S.W.2d
972 (1942).
The other, less restrictive type of statute was adopted by Tennessee, see note 4 supra,
which prohibited snakehandling "in such a manner as to endanger the life or health
of any person." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2208 (1975). Yet, in Harden v. State, 188
Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948), the court held that the religious handling of snakes
is "dangerous to the life and health of people . . . when and wherever the practice is
being indulged." Id. at 25, 216 S.W.2d at 711 (emphasis added). In Hill v. State, 38
Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 617, 88 So. 2d 887 (1956), a statute
identical to the Tennessee statute in Harden was held constitutional with the factual de-
termination whether persons were endangered left to the jury. Id. at 410, 88 So. 2d
at 885. In State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949), an ordinance outlawed
handling poisonous snakes in a "manner as to endanger the public health, safety, and
welfare." The court held the religious use of poisonous snakes dangerous to the public
health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 735, 51 S.E.2d at 179. But, in Kirk v. Common-
wealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947), the court reversed a conviction for man-
slaughter in connection with a death resulting from snakehandling for failing to instruct
that "it is not a violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia per se to handle
a poisonous serpent" Id. at 848, 44 S.E.2d at 413.
Thus, all but one of these cases have declared the religious handling of poisonous
snakes illegal either by specific statutory prohibition or by judicial interpretation of the
state statute. The similar results, despite differing statutes and factual circumstances,
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reversion to a strict action-belief dichotomy in snakehandling cases in
complete opposition to the Supreme Court's stance on the free exercise
of religion, and a fortification of a judicial trend suggesting religious
persecution.61 The resort to outright prohibition in Pack is precedent
that should not be followed in other first amendment freedom
controversies.
suggest that the prohibition is based on moral repugnance for such activity in connection
with religious worship. See Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 So. CAL. L.
REV. 546, 568 (1963).
61. The Jehovah's Witnesses are an example of a religious sect whose situation even-
tually received judicial remedy. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), a challenge by a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses to a compulsory pledge
of allegiance requirement was rejected; yet, three years later in West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court reversed itself and held
a similar requirement unconstitutional. In Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), the
Court upheld the validity of a licensing fee for door-to-door salesmen which adversely
affected Jehovah's Witnesses who are required by their religion to proselytize by door-
to-door sales. Yet, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court va-
cated its opinion in Jones and held that the licensing fee was a denial of freedom of
religion, speech, and press.
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